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Abstract
A simple theoretical network model is introduced to investigate the problem
of network interconnection. Prices, profits and welfare are compared under welfare
maximisation, network monopoly and network monopoly with competition over one
part of the network. Given that inducing actual competition may bring disbenefits
such as cost duplication and co-ordination costs, we also explore the possibility of
a regulator using the threat of entry on a section of the monopoly network in order
to bring about the socially preferred level of interconnectivity. We show that there
are feasible parameter values for which such a threat is plausible.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been renewed focus on issues of competition and integration within
complementary and substitute product markets following the development of computer
systems and the internet, which has motivated research into complicated networks with
varying degrees of connectivity. The initial technological development saw the results
of Cournot (1838) concerning complementary and substitute goods being extended by
Economides and Salop (1992) and Matutes and Regibeau (1992), amongst others. More
recently there have been a number of studies that have applied the analysis to pol-
icy decisions, such as studies on computer operating systems (Gisser and Allen, 2001;
McHardy, 2006) and video games (Clements and Ohashi, 2005). Gabszewicz et al. (2001)
consider price equilibria where products are each indivisible but their joint consumption
results in a higher utility than the sum of the utilities when the products are consumed
in isolation. Denicolo (2000) considers compatibility within a bundling framework and
Zhou (2003) looks at the level of access to telecommunications markets. There is also a
history of such analysis in the transport literature such as Else and James (1994) who
look at the railways, and McHardy and Trotter (2006) who consider airlines. Addition-
ally, Newbery (1999) explores a number of issues regarding network utilities and Baumol
and Sidak (1994) consider inter-connection and how to encourage entry, amongst other
things, in local telephony.
Much of the literature deals with incentives in the network set-ups and resulting
pricing. In particular, there is a great deal of research that deals with access pricing
under various structures - see Laffont and Tirole (1994, 1996), Armstrong et al. (1996),
and Armstrong and Vickers (1998). These papers tend to focus on networks tradition-
ally seen as natural monopolies, and consider how, at what price and where it is best
to introduce competition to ensure beneficial results. This paper focuses on when and
where to encourage competition to bring about a network set-up that would be pre-
ferred by the end user. The model has two possible network configurations that can
be selected by the firm(s): fully-connected and incomplete with the network operator
choosing between the more expensive, fuller system that allows quicker access or the less
3
costly system with indirect connection. The type of network operator is varied and the
situations where ownership regimes provide a fully-connected network are compared.
Using a transport network as an example, the paper explores the effects of permitting
entry by other operators when the network is operated by an incumbent monopolist
subject to a regulator, and how the regulator can use entry to achieve the socially de-
sirable provision of the network.
The model in this paper has a number of differences and similarities with other areas
of network theory, not just the access pricing literature. Inter-connection is applicable
but there are no specific externalities attached to either of the network configurations
here. Nor are there any issues of compatibility. The network operator chooses the
configuration of the network and the network will function correctly. This immediately
differentiates this model from the network externalities literature - like the seminal paper
by Katz and Shapiro (1985), which considers the presence of network externalities and
how this impacts upon competition and compatibility. However, their finding that firms
may choose complete compatibility at the detriment of consumer surplus is relevant
when considering the conclusions of this paper. Additionally another paper that includes
network externalities, Lambertini and Orsini (2001) that finds an oversupply of quality
compared to the social optimum, is of interest when it comes to discussing the results
in the final part of this paper.
The following section introduces a simple three-sector network model. Section 3
considers the benchmark scenario of the welfare-maximising social planner. Section 4
introduces a profit-maximising network monopolist, and considers the circumstances
under which the network monopolist and social planners’ choices over a complete or
incomplete network coincide (requiring no regulation) or differ. Section 5 considers the
possibility of entry on a sub-section of the network. Section 6 summarises the results
and their policy implications.
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2 The network
Consider the simple network shown in Figure 1. Let it represent (part of) the transport
network in a circular city, and assume there are three public transport services along
routes 1, 2 and 3 between the three origins and destinations r, s and t. This network
can serve demands for radial travel between the city centre (s) and the perimeter of the
city (points r and t) as well as non-diameter chord travel (between r and t). This simple
network, therefore, allows for direct travel between points on the perimeter along route
1 as well as indirect travel between these points using routes 2 and 3. For passengers
wishing to travel between r and t, the combined services along routes 2 and 3 (which
are perfect complements) now provide a substitute for route 1.
We now make specific a key assumption of the model.
Assumption 1. Services on radial routes 2 and 3 are always provided.
In the next section we impose restrictions on key parameter values to ensure that
Assumption 1 is justified within the appropriate maximising framework for each regime
(so it is an equilibrium outcome of the model). However, the purpose for Assumption 1 is
to frame the question of network interconnectivity in terms of whether or not the direct
cross-city (chord) service (route 1) is provided. A key question is then whether or not
a monopoly public transport provider would (would not) provide the complete network
when it is (is not) socially optimal to do so. In the situation where there is a mismatch
between the network monopoly decision and that of a social planner we consider how
using entry or the threat of entry on the network may help align the objectives of the
public transport provider with the society’s interests.
By definition, routes 2 and 3 are of equal length (the radius of the circular city),
which for simplicity is normalised to unity. Therefore, route 1 is the chord joining r and
t with length x. In this framework, x lies in the open interval 0 < x < 2.
Suppose the relevant public transport provider charges a fare, fi, for travel on route
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i (i = 1, 2, 3). Let the demand for direct travel along route i be given by:
Q1 = α− x− f1, (1a)
Qj = β − 1− fj , (j = 2, 3). (1b)
where α and β are positive constants. As the city centre has a radius of one then to
ensure that (1a) and (1b) are positive, at least at zero fares, and given 0 < x < 2, let:
α ≥ 2, β > 1. (2)
For simplicity we assume that the psychological passenger cost per unit distance is
unity; thus for passengers on routes 2 and 3 (which have unit length) the relevant cost
is also unity, whilst for passengers of route 1 it is x.1 It follows that the generalised cost
of direct travel along mn (m 6= n = r, s, t), Gmn, is given by:
Grt = f1 + x, Grs = f2 + 1, Gst = f3 + 1. (3)
Clearly each journey can be undertaken directly using one route or indirectly using
the remaining two routes. This paper allows the provision of services along route 1 to be
an option for the relevant service provider. In order to compare the gains to the relevant
operator with and without services on route 1 and to incorporate the fact that pricing
decisions on route 1 must be undertaken in the knowledge that too high a fare may divert
passengers onto routes 2 and 3, it is necessary to consider the demands for the alternative
journey rt via s. Assuming that there is no interchange penalty, the generalised cost for
a passenger making indirect travel along mn via l (m 6= n 6= l = r, s, t), Gmln, is given
by:
Grst = 2 + f2 + f3, (4a)
Gstr = 1 + x+ f1 + f3, (4b)
1It is also assumed that all services travel at an equal (constant) speed; hence, there is no need to
introduce a separate time-cost parameter in the generalised travel cost.
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Gtrs = 1 + x+ f1 + f3. (4c)
If f1 is prohibitively high or services on route 1 are not provided, then all rt travel is
diverted through routes 2 and 3. For example, the operator may charge such a large
fare on route 1 (or alternatively they may decide not to provide it) that rt travellers
would rather journey along routes 2 and 3 - if this was the case then they would face
generalised cost (4a). Using the demand densities from (1) and the generalised cost
(4a) the total demand for travel on route j (own route-specific demand and indirect rst
demand), Qˆj , is given by:
2
Qˆj = α+ β − 3− 2fj − fk, (j 6= k = 2, 3). (5)
In terms of the cost structure of the model, it is assumed that public transport
provision on a route has a zero marginal cost per passenger; however, there is a non-zero
operating cost per unit distance.3 Setting F as the operating cost per unit distance, it
follows that the operating cost for routes 2 and 3 (which have unit length) is F whilst
for route 1 the operating cost is Fx.
3 A first-best social planner
Before considering the conditions under which a first-best social planner would choose
to provide services along route 1, we construct expressions for the consumer surplus
associated with each individual route. With the social planner engaging in marginal-
cost pricing, our assumption of zero marginal cost implies a fare of zero on each route:
fSi = 0, (∀i = 1, 2, 3). (6)
Consumer surplus on each route then becomes:
CS1 =
1
2
(α− x)2, (7a)
2Throughout the paper, terms indicated with a ”∧” relate to the incomplete network - i.e. excluding
route 1.
3This means that there are no capital costs in the model.
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CS2 = C
S
3 =
1
2
(β − 1)2. (7b)
In order for the framework to be consistent with route 1 being the marginal route
for the purposes of this paper, we impose constraints on the parameters of the model.
Lemma 1. The following constraints on the values α, β, and x are sufficient to ensure
that at the socially optimal prices the consumer surplus on the incomplete network with
routes 2 and 3 provided CˆS
S
23 is always strictly greater than the level of consumer surplus
on the incomplete network with routes 1 and j (j = 2, 3) CˆS
S
1j.
α > β − x− 1. (8)
Proof. Given the socially optimal pricing (6), consumer surplus on the incomplete net-
work excluding route 1 is given by:
CˆS
S
23 = [β − 1 + max(0, α− 2)]2 , (9a)
and consumer surplus on the incomplete network excluding route j (j = 2, 3) is given
by:
CˆS
S
1j =
1
2
[α− x+ max(0, β − x− 1)]2 + 1
2
[β − 1 + max(0, β − x− 1)]2 . (9b)
This justifies our assumption that routes 2 and 3 are always provided; implying that
the demand on the radial routes is denser.4 Given this assumption, the decision to
provide route 1 is now of particular interest. Had route 1 been an important route to
the traveler then finding it to be provided would be unremarkable.
We now consider the conditions under which a social planner would provide route
1. It follows from (6) that network revenue under the social planner is zero, so welfare
4In the context of the transport example, this is intuitively appealing as we would expect more
travelers to pass through a city centre.
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is derived solely from consumer surplus. In the case where the social planner provides
services on route 1, total consumer surplus across the system, CS , is then:
CS =
3∑
i=1
=
1
2
(α− x)2 + (β − 1)2. (10)
Welfare under the social planner with route 1 provided, WS , is consumer surplus minus
the operating costs of the three routes:
WS = CS − (2 + x)F = 1
2
(α− x)2 + (β − 1)2 − (2 + x)F. (11)
If the social planner does not provide route 1 then the consumer surplus is measured in
relation to the alternative demands in (5). Welfare, WˆS , is then:
WˆS =
1
2
(α− x)2 + (β − 1)2 − 2F. (12)
We are now able to consider the social planner’s optimal network provision.
Proposition 1. The welfare-maximising social planner would prefer to provide a com-
plete network if the constant operating cost per unit distance satisfies the inequality:
F <
1
2x
[(α− x)2 − (α− 2)2]. (13)
Proof. Subtracting (11) from (10) and rearranging in terms of F gives (13).
Corollary 1. If the constant operating cost per unit distance is zero, the welfare max-
imising social planner will always provide a complete network.
Proof. Given (2) and 0 < x < 2 we can see that all the elements of (13) are non-negative;
that is (α − x)2 > 0, (α − 2)2 ≥ 0, and 2x > 0. We can also see from (2) and from
0 < x < 2 that (α− x)2 > (α− 2)2.
Setting (13) as an equality, we define the social planner’s threshold cost for providing
a complete network i.e. the level of constant operating costs (per unit distance) which
makes the social planner indifferent between providing a service on route 1 and not
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providing a service, F˜S :
F˜S =
1
2x
[(α− x)2 − (α− 2)2]. (14)
(14) provides a useful benchmark level of operating cost. If for some level of F below
F˜S a regime does not provide route 1 then the regime’s network is socially suboptimal.
Corollary 2. The welfare maximising social planner would provide a complete network
for an increasing (decreasing) range of constant operating costs per unit distance as α
(x) rises.
Proof. Partially differentiating the bracketed part of the R.H.S. of (14) with respect to
x and α, respectively, gives:
∂F˜S
∂x
=
x2 − 4α+ 4
2x2
, (15a)
∂F˜S
∂α
=
2− x
x
. (15b)
Using (2) it can be shown that (15a) is non-positive whilst (15b) is always strictly
positive.
Corollaries 1 and 2 show that we have a well-behaved model with intuitive results.
As the length of the direct route, x, falls - recall that the length of the indirect route
along 2 and 3 remains constant - then the benefit that society gets from the existence of
route 1 increases. Equally, an increase in α means that there are more travellers moving
along route 1, so the absolute gains from providing the direct route increase.
4 Network monopoly
The case of network monopoly is more complicated than that of the social planner, since
the monopolist has to select the network structure (whether or not to provide route 1)
and the optimum level of fares which are interdependent, whilst the planner’s price policy
is independent of choice of routes. However, matters are made more straightforward by
the symmetrical nature of routes 2 and 3. It follows that whatever the monopolist’s
choice of network configuration and fare structure, the optimal fare for route 2 will be
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the same as that for route 3. Dealing with the scenario in which the network monopolist
supplies a complete network, the general expression for network profit, piM , is:
piM = f1(α− x− f1) + 2fj(β − 1− fj)(2 + x)F, (16)
where fj is the common fare on routes 2 and 3. Profit maximisation yields the following
optimal network monopoly fares under a complete network:
f1 =
α− x
2
, (17a)
fj =
β − 1
2
. (17b)
Substituting (17) into (16) gives the reduced-form network monopoly profit:
piM =
1
4
(α− x)2 + 1
2
(β − 1)2 − (2 + x)F. (18)
If, however, the network monopolist supplies an incomplete network (omitting route 1),
the general expression for network profit is, pˆiM :
pˆiM = 2fj(α+ β − 3− 3fj)− 2F. (19)
In this case profit maximisation yields the following optimal network monopoly fares
under an incomplete network:
fˆj =
1
6
(α+ β − 3), (j = 2, 3). (20)
Substituting (20) into (19) gives the reduced-form expression for maximum monopoly
profit with an incomplete network:
pˆiM =
1
6
(α+ β − 3)2 − 2F. (21)
Proposition 2. The network monopolist would strictly prefer a complete network if the
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constant operating cost per unit distance satisfies the inequality:
F <
α2 + 12α− 6αx+ 3x2 + 4β2 − 12− 4αβ
12x
. (22)
Proof. Subtracting (21) from (18) gives:
piM − pˆiM = α2 + 12α− 6αx+ 3x2 + 4β2 − 4αβ − 12− 12Fx. (23)
It is straightforward to show that the right-hand side of this equation will be positive
as long as F is less than the critical value in (22).
The expression on the R.H.S. of (22) gives us the network monopolist’s threshold
operating cost below which a full network will be supplied, analogous to F˜S for the social
planner in the previous section. Like the social planner, the network monopolist would
always find it more profitable to supply a complete network if there was no operating
cost:
Corollary 3. If the constant operating cost per unit distance is zero, the network mo-
nopolist will always provide a complete network.
We now consider the monopolist’s decision when it faces the social planner’s thresh-
old operating cost (F˜S).
Proposition 3. When faced with the social planner’s threshold operating cost then the
monopolist’s benefits from providing a complete network increase as β and x rise, and
as α falls.
Proof. The monopolist is indifferent between supplying a complete network and an in-
complete network with operating cost, F˜S , if ϑM (F˜S) = piM (F˜S)− pˆiM (F˜S) = 0. Using
(14), (18) and (21) gives:
ϑM (F˜S) = α2 + 6αx− 3x2 + 4β2 + 12− 12α− 4αβ. (24)
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Partially differentiating (24) with respect to α, β and x gives, respectively:
∂ϑM (F˜S)
∂α
= 2(α+ 3x− 6− 2β), (25a)
∂ϑM (F˜S)
∂β
= 4(2β − α), (25b)
∂ϑM (F˜S)
∂x
= 6(α− x). (25c)
Using (2) it can seen that (25a) is always positive, so (24) is increasing in x. Given (8)
then (25b) is negative and (25c) is positive, so (24) is decreasing in α and increasing in
β.
Corollary 4. The monopolist will provide route 1 when the social planner does; how-
ever, when the social planner does not provide a complete network it is possible that the
monopolist will.
Proof. This proof is readily verified by using simulations in the relevant range of α, β,
and x. Given (2) and (8) we can show that 6αx > 3x2 and 4β2 + α2 + 12 > 4αβ + 12α
so (24) is always positive.
Proposition 3 establishes that the parameters for which the monopolist and social
planner provide a complete network do not always match and figures 2 and 3 underline
this. Figures 2 and 3 show this graphically by plotting the social planner’s and the mo-
nopolist’s threshold operating costs. The area on and below the lines shows values for
which each would provide a complete network; any area that is below both lines repre-
sents a situation where the monopolist and social planner agree in providing a complete
network.5 As shown in Corollary 4, Figure 2 shows the monopolist provides route 1
for some values that the social planner would not and as α increases the monopolist
becomes more willing to provide route 1 for values that the social planner would prefer
an incomplete network.
5Conversely, any area above both lines shows when the monopolist and social planner agree in
providing an incomplete network.
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Figure 3 shows what happens if α takes on its largest possible value in relation to
β, that is (8) becomes an equality. This further underlines corollary 4, showing that as
α rises (meaning the minimum allowable β also rises) then the monopolist continues to
provide a complete network for a larger range of values than the social planner would
prefer.
5 The impact of an entrant
This section considers the effect on a network monopolist’s fare structure and network
configuration when a regulator allows rival firms to enter the network.6 To emphasise
that the network monopolist now faces the possibility of entry on part of its network
we shall refer to it as an incumbent. Initially we look at the effect on network provision
and the incumbent’s behaviour when entry is allowed onto route 1. Then we move on
to look at entry on route 2 - due to the symmetry of the model, the analysis would,
of course, apply equally to route 3 - and pose the question “will the introduction of
a rival on route 2 cause the incumbent to provide a complete network (when it was
previously incomplete)?”, by considering the case in which entry on route 2 leads to a
Cournot quantity game on that route.7 We investigate whether the incumbent can use
its provision of route 1 as a strategic tool to reduce profitability on route 2 and hence
exclude the entrant(s).
The general expression for the profit of an incumbent providing a complete network,
using (1), is:
piI = qI1(α− x−Q1) + f2(β − 1− f2) + f3(β − 1− f3)− F (2 + x). (26)
The profit function for an entrant k on route 1 is:
piEk = qEk1 (α− x−Q1)− Fx, (27)
6This is not a free-entry model, instead the regulator is able to set the number of entrants.
7In both cases the analysis is restricted to when the operating costs of operation are low enough to
accommodate n-firm entry under the Cournot regime.
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where qEk1 is the entrant’s output. This assumes that the entrant faces the same oper-
ating cost as the incumbent.
If nE1 is the total number of entrants on route 1 then total output on route 1, Q1,
will be the sum of the quantities produced by all firms and can be defined by:
Q1 = q
I
1 + n
E
1 q
Ek
1 . (28)
Profit maximisation implies the fares given in (17b) and with the Cournot assumption
on route 1 the equilibrium fare is:
f1 =
(α− x)
(1 + n1)
, (29)
where n1 = 1 + n
E
1 . Calculating firm outputs and using (28) before substituting (29)
into (26) and (27) gives profits:
piI =
(α− x)2
(1 + n1)2
+
(β − 1)2
2
− F (2 + x), (30a)
piEk =
(α− x)2
(1 + n1)2
− Fx. (30b)
If, on the other hand, the incumbent chooses not to provide services on route 1, but the
entrant(s) do, then we do not get the switch in demands from (1) to (5) that we saw
previously; the rival firms offer route 1 so the incumbent’s profit becomes:
pˆiI =
(β − 1)2
2
− 2F. (31)
Profit for an entrant i on route 2 is:
pˆiEk = qEk1 (α− x−Q1)− Fx. (32)
As the incumbent is no longer supplying route 1 then qI1 = 0, so Qˆ1 can be defined as:
Qˆ1 = n
E
1 q
Ek
1 . (33)
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Profit maximisation gives the equilibrium fare of the entrant:
fˆ1 =
α− x
1 + nE1
. (34)
Calculating entrant output, then using this and (34) in (32) gives profit:
pˆiEk =
(α− x)2
(1 + nE1 )
2
− Fx. (35)
Proposition 4. The entrant(s) will provide route 1 for higher levels of the constant
operating cost per unit distance than the incumbent.
Proof. The incumbent’s threshold operating cost in the provision of route 1, calculated
by subtracting (31) from (30a), is:
F˜ I =
(α− x)2
(1 + n1)2x
. (36)
The incumbent would thus provide route 1 if:
F˜ I <
(α− x)2
(1 + n1)2x
. (37)
The entrant’s threshold operating cost if the incumbent did not provide route 1 would,
from (35), be:
F˜E =
(α− x)2
(1 + nE1 )
2x
. (38)
The entrant would thus provide route 1 when the incumbent does not if:
F˜E <
(α− x)2
(1 + nE1 )
2x
. (39)
As nE1 < n1 we can see that (36) would always be smaller than (38).
As the entrant always provides route 1 when the incumbent does then we can con-
centrate on route 1 entrant’s threshold operating cost as it determines when a complete
network is provided, and we can compare this with the social planner’s preferred provi-
sion of route 1.
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Proposition 5. Entry on route 1 can lead to the provision of a complete network that
more closely matches the provision of the social planner than the monopolist’s provision.
Proof. Figures 4 and 5 depict simulations of (14), (22) and (38) indicating a non-empty
parameter set under which entry on route 1 brings about the provision of a complete
network, completing the proof.
Figure 4 is Figure 2 with the entrant’s threshold operating cost added and this lies
just beneath the social planner’s operating cost so that the entrant would provide an
incomplete network when the social planner would prefer a complete one. This means
that with entry on route 1 we have the possibility that an incomplete network may
be provided when a social planner would prefer a complete network - conversely a mo-
nopolist would provide route 1 for values that the social planner would not. However,
the entrant’s threshold operating cost is a closer representation of the social planner’s
preference than the monopolist’s. Figure 4 looks at a higher level of α and shows that,
again, for the most part, the entrant would provide a level of network provision that
matches the social planner more closely than the monopolist, although this time at a
level above the social planner and at low levels of β we have the possibility that the
entrant would provide a complete network for values that the monopolist would not.
This means that the network regulator could use entry on route 1 to provide a level of
provision close to what the social planner would prefer, but would also have to carefully
monitor the situation.
Route 1 is not the only viable place for the introduction of entrants and we now
investigate what happens if competition is allowed on one of the radial routes - route 2
for convenience.
The general expression for the profit of the incumbent providing a complete network,
using (1), is:
piI = f1(α− x− f1) + qI2(β − 1−Q3) + f3(β − 1− f3)− F (2 + x), (40)
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where qI2 is the demand supplied by the incumbent. If n
E
3 is the total number of entrants
then total output for route 3, Q2, can be defined by:
Q2 = q
I
2 + n
E
2 q
Ek
2 , (41)
where qEk2 is the demand supplied by each entrant. Profit for the k
th entrant becomes:
piEk = qEk2 (β − 1−Q2)− F. (42)
Profit maximisation implies the first-order conditions (17a) and (17b) for j = 2 and
given the Cournot assumption, on route 2 the equilibrium fare is:
f2 =
β − 1
1 + n2
, (43)
where n2 = 1 + n
E
2 .
Calculating firm outputs then using this, (41) and (43) in (40) gives profits:
piI =
(1 + n2)
2(α− x)2 + (n22 + 2n2 + 5)(β − 1)2
4(1 + n2)2
− f(2 + x), (44a)
piEk =
(β − 1)2
(1 + n2)2
− F. (44b)
If, on the other hand, the incumbent chooses not to provide services on route 1,
demands on routes 2 and 3 become interlinked by the diverted route 1 passengers. The
profits for the incumbent and entrant, respectively, are:
pˆiI =
qI2
2
(α+ β − 3− f2 −Q2) + f3(α+ β − 3− f2 − 2f3)− 2F, (45a)
pˆiEk =
qEk2
2
(α+ β − 3− f2 −Q2)− F. (45b)
Maximising incumbent and entrant profits with respect to output on route 2, then
substituting the values of qI3 and Q3 into (44a), before again maximising and solving
gives the fare for route 2:
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f3 =
n2(6n2 + 5)(α+ β − 3)
4(4n22 + 6n2 + 3)
. (46)
Calculating firm outputs, and using (14), (41) and (46) in (45) yields profits for the
incumbent and entrant, respectively:
pˆiI =
(16n42 + 96n
3
2 + 120n
2
2 + 64n2 + 13)(α+ β − 3)2
8(4n22 + 6n2 + 3)
2
− 2F, (47a)
pˆiEk =
n2(6n2 + 5)
2(α+ β − 3)2
8(4n22 + 6n2 + 3)
2
− F. (47b)
Proposition 6. Entry on route 2 (or 3) can lead to the provision of a complete net-
work that more closely matches the provision of the social planner than the monopolist’s
provision.
Proof. Calculating the net gain to the incumbent from offering a complete network
relative to an incomplete network by subtracting (44a) from (47a) and solve for F ,
gives:
F˜ IZ =
(1 + n2)
2(α− x)2 + (n22 + 2n2 + 5)(β − 1)2
4x(1 + n2)2
−(16n
4
2 + 96n
3
2 + 120n
2
2 + 64n2 + 13)(α+ β − 3)2
8x(4n22 + 6n2 + 3)
2
.
(48)
Figures 6 and 7 depict simulations of (14), (22) and (48) indicating a non-empty pa-
rameter set under which entry on route 2 (or 3) increases profit for the incumbent by
moving to a complete network from an incomplete network.
At first glance, it might seem that the incumbent would provide route 1 as a strategic
tool against the entry on route 2. However, what actually happens is that the entry
on route 2 causes a fall in the price that the incumbent can charge on route 1 and this
reduces the range of values over which it provides a complete network. Figures 6 and 7
show this, but we can also see that with entry on route 2 there is the possibility that
the incumbent will not provide route 1 when the social planner would prefer it to.
We may expect that route 1 is the preferable place to introduce entry as this is the
route that completes the network; however this may not always be the case. Indeed, a
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regulator could introduce entry on route 3 in preference to entry on route 1.
Proposition 7. The welfare arising from complete network provision with entry on
route 2 (or 3) can be larger than the welfare from complete network provision with entry
on route 1, when all firms face the social planner’s threshold operating cost.
Proof. Using (17b) and (29) in (1) gives the following outputs:
Q11 =
n1(α− x)
(1 + n1)
, (49a)
Q12 = Q
1
3 =
α− 1
2
. (49b)
Welfare for each route can be calculated using:
Wi = fiQi +
1
2
(c− fi)Qi − TFi, (50)
where c is the y-axis intercept on the demand curve and TFi is the total constant
operating cost associated with running the route. Substituting the relevant values for
each route into (51) gives the welfare for each route:
W 11 =
3n1(α− x)2
2(1 + n1)2
− n1Fx, (51a)
W 12 = W
1
3 =
3(α− 1)2
8
− F. (51b)
Summing the elements of (52) together gives total welfare:
W 1T =
3n1(α− x)2
2(1 + n1)2
+
3(β − 1)2
8
− F (2 + n1F ). (52)
If the incumbent does not enter route 1 then welfare becomes:
W 1T =
3nE1 (α− x)2
2(1 + nE1 )
2
+
3(β − 1)2
8
− F (2 + nE1 F ). (53)
Now let us consider when there is entry on route 3. Using (17) and (44) in (1) gives the
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following outputs:
Q21 =
(α− x)
2
, (54a)
Q22 =
(β − 1)
2
, (54b)
Q23 =
n2(β − 1)
1 + n2
. (54c)
Substituting the relevant values for each route into (51) gives the welfare for each route:
W 21 =
3(α− x)2
8
− Fx, (55a)
W 22 =
3(β − 1)2
8
− F, (55b)
W 23 =
3n3(β − 1)2
2(1 + n3)2
− nF. (55c)
Summing the (56) together gives total welfare:
W 2T =
3(α− x)2 + 3(β − 1)2
8
+
3n2(β − 1)2
2(1 + n2)2
− F (x+ 1 + n2). (56)
If the incumbent does not enter route 1 then welfare becomes:
W 3T =
(3(α− x)2) + 3(β − 1)2
8
+
3nE2 (β − 1)2
2(1 + nE2 )
2
− F (x+ 1 + nE2 ). (57)
Producing simulations of (51) and (56) using F˜S as the operating cost gives Figure
8.
6 Conclusions
We find a network operator may not always provide a full network that includes all
the possible direct combinations of routes. The values at which a social planner and a
network monopolist would provide a complete network are established to show that a
monopolist will often provide a complete network when the social planner would pre-
fer an incomplete network - suggesting that the monopolist ‘over-supplies’ the network,
so despite the differences in our model we find results similar to those of Katz and
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Shapiro (1985) and Lambertini and Orsini (2001). By considering a regulator that can
allow entry on to one of the routes we find that a regulator, if they believe the socially
preferable level of network interconnection is not being provided by an existing network
monopolist, can ensure that a situation closer to the social planner’s preference can be
provided. More precisely, it can do this by allowing entry in one of two ways: onto the
previously non-supplied route or where the incumbent is already operating.
A simple network model has been introduced and used to investigate network ser-
vice provision. It can be shown that, when an operating cost is present, a network
monopolist always offers a complete network when a social planner would. However,
the monopolist will also tend to supply a complete network in situations that the social
planner would prefer it not to. We consider two options open to the regulator that
can reduce this ‘over-provision’. Firstly, it can take direct action by allowing entry on
route 1; this can cause the entrant to provide a level of complete network provision
closer to the preferences of the social planner than the monopolist would. If allowing
entry on route 1 is not plausible or desirable then the regulator can also ensure the
provision of a complete network is closer to the social planner’s preference by allowing
entry on route 2 or 3. It is possible that route 3 entry that leads to a complete net-
work may provide greater welfare than route 1 entry which result in a complete network.
Introducing entry is not without its disadvantages as it introduces the possibility
that the provision of route 1 could drop to levels below those desired by the social
planner. Route 1 entry could even lead to the provision of route 1 for a greater range
than the monopolist. For both these reasons it is vital that the regulator continues to
check that the appropriate conditions for the introduction of entry exist and continues
to monitor the industry if it allows entry. The regulator should also carefully control
the number of firms it allows into the market.
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Figure 1: A Simple Network
Figure 2: Network with α = 5 and x = 0.5
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Figure 3: Network with α = β − 1− x and x = 0.5
Figure 4: Network with α = 5, x = 0.5 and n = 1
25
Figure 5: Network with α = 10, x = 0.1 and n = 1
Figure 6: Network with α = 5, x = 0.1 and n = 1
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Figure 7: Network with α = 10, x = 0.5 and n = 1
Figure 8: Network with where n = 5, x = 1.6, and α = 8
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